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MONETARY POLICYThis Commentary provides an insider’s perspective on Canada’s difficult experience with
inflation before the mid-1990s and draws some general lessons from this historical record for
today’s monetary policy. 
The study explains how and why inflation took hold in the early 1970s, and describes two
subsequent battles against it – a drawn out one that lasted until 1987, and a shorter one
conducted between 1987 and 1992. The author answers arguments that this second
campaign was not needed,  that the “great inflation” was over by 1987 and that 4 percent
inflation would have been good enough for the long term. Four percent, he says, was not a
credible goal because economic agents would have been unlikely to grant much credibility to
a regime that seemed content with inflation that high. Something significantly lower was
needed and, he suggests, subsequent experience has not contradicted this conclusion. 
The study draws a number of important lessons from this review of the policy record. 
￿ The commonly held view that the big change in inflation performance in Canada came
with the introduction of inflation targets in 1991 overlooks the way in which monetary
policy after 1987 laid the essential groundwork for their subsequent success.
￿ While the Canadian economy is relatively small and very open, home-grown monetary
policy has generated a decent domestic inflation performance since the early 1990s. External
conditions can and do matter, but the evidence shows that they are not decisive. The
Canadian dollar’s exchange rate has behaved in a broadly appropriate way as an adjustment
mechanism, allowing Canadian monetary policy to focus on stabilizing the currency’s
domestic value, thus making a sustained contribution to national economic well-being. 
￿ Canadian experience supports the maxim that “inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon” – in the following particular sense: no policy regime aimed at
reducing or preventing inflation can be fully effective unless the central bank takes a
prominent role, or better still the lead, in articulating its goals and implementing the
policies designed to attain them. Relying on the general government successfully to take
the lead in inflation control, whether by way of fiscal policy or income controls, or
through executive direction in monetary policy, is inadequate.
￿ The multiplicity of governmental objectives and the speed with which priorities among
them are inevitably shuffled by the pressures of politics also contributes to the case for
delegating a key role in inflation control to the central bank. It is important that
government recognizes this, and, always subject to its ultimate political authority over
monetary matters, grants the central bank the latitude needed to take the lead in deciding
what has to be done under any but the most exceptional circumstances. 
￿ Whatever specific modifications to Canada’s monetary policy regime may emerge from
its currently ongoing review, they should build upon the lessons yielded by earlier
experience so as to further enhance Canadians’ confidence in their country’s future
monetary stability.
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S
horter-run biases in economic
policy stack the deck in favour of
inflation. So while accommo-
dating and encouraging inflation is all
too easy, limiting and reducing
inflation is not. This is why a strong
framework for monetary policy aimed
at preventing inflation is so valuable.
Over the past two decades, Canada has gone some
considerable distance in securing such a framework,
and with that experience under its belt, the Bank of
Canada is currently engaged in examining how that
framework might be improved. This is welcome. It is
also timely to look back further – to reflect on the
cautionary lessons from years earlier when such a
framework was lacking. Accordingly, my aim here is
to analyze why and how Canada’s inflation
experience deteriorated so in the early 1970s, and
examine the subsequent drawn-out struggle – first to
staunch the upsurge and then to reverse it.
The narrative that follows can usefully be divided
into two parts. The first looks at experience with
inflation from the early 1970s up to 1987 – years
when inflation was a continual threat. The second
examines what happened in the years thereafter,
focussing mainly on what occurred during my
seven-year term as central bank governor, from early
1987 to early 1994.1
Section One: The Period to 1987 –
Playing Catch-Up
The Bank of Canada’s struggle, and from time to
time that of the Federal government, to contain the
inflation upsurge during this period stemmed
initially from bad luck, but was severely
compounded by policy missteps. The bad luck for
Canada had two components:  first, its being tied in
the late 1960s under Bretton Woods to the US
economy as demand pressures accumulated there;
and second, its being the recipient, like everyone
else, of two oil (mostly) shocks in the 1970s. The
missteps by policymakers were: first, while taking
the bold step of moving to a floating exchange rate
in early 1970 and seeing it appreciate, they did not
take advantage, in the end, of its inflation-
protection properties; and second, they
compounded this lapse by pursuing demand
policies (particularly fiscal policies) that helped
propagate the relative price shocks from oil and
grains generally and cumulatively. Monetary policy,
while always concerned over inflation, was imbued
with a spirit of gradualism when it did address
inflation directly. Overall, the Bank of Canada was
largely in a reactive mode to what turned up,
whether in terms of what the federal government
thought could or should be done by Canada about
inflation, or in terms of what happened in the
United States regarding inflation control. 
It should be added for completeness that in the
early 1970s there was genuine uncertainty as to the
amount of slack in the economy. This arose mainly
because of changes to the economic meaning of the
unemployment statistics – changes brought about by
increases in the incentives to remain unemployed
stemming from substantially improved terms for
unemployment insurance that were introduced in
1971/72. The general assessment of the likely growth
of Canadian productivity (about 2 percent) also
turned out to be over-optimistic. However, these
difficulties for analysis and forecasting were a
secondary factor in the general, somewhat tentative
and episodic, approach to inflation control taken in
that period. The basic rule was that whatever was to
be done regarding inflation, there was to be no
economic slack generated on this account. So policy
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The author wishes to thank Gordon Thiessen, William Robson and David Laidler for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are
the responsibility of the author.
1 I should add that I was at the Bank of Canada from 1973, and for several years before that was working on Canada for the International
Monetary Fund. Therefore, this account, while unofficial, reflects considerable direct knowledge of, and involvement in, what happened
throughout this period and the reasons why. This involvement also means that my account emphasizes how policy evolved through the piece
on the basis of the lessons learned, as well as the considerable challenges in getting those lessons accepted. In this respect, it stands as an
insider’s counterpart to the briefer account of this period’s monetary experience that comprises a section of William Robson’s March 2009



































Canada United States Differential
Figure 1: Consumer Price Index, 1960-2009 



















Canada United States Differential
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate, Seasonally Adjusted, 1976-2009
Source: CANSIM tables 451-0006 and 282-0087.in general, and monetary policy in particular, was
fighting inflation, and pessimistic expectations about
inflation, with at least one hand behind its back.2
Floating for What?
When Canada floated its currency in 1970 –
thereby breaking the Bretton Woods rules that fixed
exchange rates in relation to the US dollar and
ultimately gold –  it contended that this was done
to gain better control over its money supply. But
interestingly enough, while the Bank of Canada
supported (of course) the government’s decision to
change the exchange rate regime, it did so with a
touch of reluctance. My interpretation of this is
that the Bank was going to lose the fixed-exchange-
rate anchor for monetary policy, and did not really
know what to put in its place. The Bank also
appeared to believe that there was more scope for
Canadian monetary policy to affect domestic
demand under the fixed-rate regime than in fact
there was. In any case, then and in the years
following, the Bank was continually looking to
coordinate with governmental actions to control
inflation. In short, monetary policy was a follower.
However, governmental attention to inflation
was sporadic. With a close to 10 percent rise in 
the currency as an early result of the float, pressure
from government switched from favouring a 
focus  on monetary control to avoiding further
appreciation of the Canadian currency against 
the US dollar.
This bias continued even as the grain-oil shock
hit from 1972 onward, and was compounded
explicitly by fiscal policy. By way of illustration, in
early 1973, just as my predecessor, Gerald Bouey,
entered office, the federal Minister of Finance, in
his budget speech, declared himself ready to run the
risk of still higher inflation as a trade-off for lower
unemployment. He also congratulated the Bank of
Canada for running a monetary policy sufficiently
expansionary to ward off Canadian dollar
appreciation.3
From then until 1987, inflation developments in
Canada basically mirrored inflation flows and ebbs
in the United States – but with somewhat more
inflation overall in Canada. This situation should
not be taken to imply that Canada gave up trying
to do something about inflation through domestic
policies. But what it did mean was that as a
reflection of this difference in inflation outcomes,
the Canadian dollar had a pronounced tendency to
depreciate bilaterally after the mid-1970s. This
tendency was also a problem that the Bank had
continually to contend against (largely through
exchange-market interventions), lest the decline in
the currency gather its own momentum and also
feed into domestic interest rates, which already
seemed far too high to most people.
Giving Monetary Aggregate Targets a Chance
In 1975, Governor Bouey delivered a speech that
came to be known among central bank observers as
the “Saskatoon Manifesto.”  In it, he stated that
“whatever else may need to be done to bring
inflation under control, it is absolutely essential to
keep the rate of monetary expansion within
reasonable limits.”
The context for these remarks, seen as drama-
tically Friedmanesque by many in Canada but as
simply practical at the Bank of Canada, was
twofold:  first, work had been done at the Bank for
several years on monetary-aggregate targeting in
response to the burgeoning academic literature, and
there was pressure on the Governor from senior staff
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2 The focus in this paper is on inflation reduction, not prevention. However, it is worth emphasizing, on a cautionary note and in a more
contemporaneous context, that the amount of slack (or recession even) that monetary policy might need to produce to prevent inflation is surely
less than what it takes subsequently to reduce it.
3 The way it was actually put by Finance Minister John Turner was that “monetary policy ... encouraged Canadians to borrow in domestic rather
than in foreign markets.”  Two and a half years later, in June 1975 and with inflation much higher still, the Minister noted in his budget speech
that “the faster rise in costs in this country than in the United States is casting a shadow over our economic future.”  However, in the same
speech, he rejected “... again, and in the most categorical manner ... the policy of deliberately creating, by severe measures of fiscal and monetary
restraint, whatever level of unemployment is required to bring inflation to an abrupt halt. ... The cost would be much too high. In human terms
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to apply it; second, there was, in 1975, a need for
the Bank to put something quantitative and of a
decelerating nature in the policy-shop window to go
along with soon-to-be-announced governmental
prices and incomes controls. The general plan was
to use interest rates to generate a progressive slowing
in monetary expansion and overall spending in
Canada that was in line with the implicit control
targets for inflation of 8 percent for the first year, 6
percent for the second, and 4 percent for the third
(Sargent 2005). This was taken to mean annual
growth rates for narrow money (M1) within a 10 to
15 percent range for the first year (but biased toward
the lower end of that range) and declining year-by-
year thereafter to approach a rate consistent with
“price stability.”  The prices and incomes controls
came into force in 1975 and were taken off in
1978.4 However, the Bank stayed with money
targets until the early 1980s.
Others, particularly at the C.D. Howe Institute,
have delved into possible advantages of monetary
aggregate targets, or indeed how exactly to look at
“money” (or “credit”) besides other things, for
useful policy information. (See Laidler and Robson
1991; Laidler and Robson 2004, Chpt. 3.) Here it
is sufficient to note that because of the strong
interest elasticity of demand for chequing balances
and the increasing substitution of interest-bearing
chequing deposits for non-interest ones, the M1
aggregates slowed drastically even as inflation was
rising in the latter part of the 1970s. The targets
were increasingly ignored both within the Bank and
outside, and finally dropped in 1982. Or, as
Governor Bouey famously put it soon after: “We
didn’t abandon M1, M1 abandoned us!”  (Bouey
1983.) The Bank pondered for quite some years
after the possibility of using a broader, less interest-
elastic and by definition more inclusive, monetary
aggregate as a target. But neither Mr. Bouey nor I
ever felt sufficient confidence in possible successors
to M1 to take that plunge a second time.
Forced Back to the Exchange Rate
The Bank of Canada’s attempt to use a money target
to slow inflation, whether as a worthy attempt to
generate a decelerating path for nominal demand in
line with the wage-price objectives of controls or on
a stand-alone basis, was in any event preempted  by
the great US disinflation, beginning in 1979. As
already noted, inflation in Canada was tending then
to run at least as high as in the United States.
What was the Bank to do in the face of the
dramatic rise in US short-term interest rates?  At
first, it basically aimed to match those increases,
with the immediate goal of avoiding a dive in the
currency. But this did not stop the Canadian dollar
from weakening sharply and threatening to cause
yet more inflation. Accordingly, the tactic shifted
from tracking US interest rates to one of squeezing
domestic liquidity harder and forcing Canadian
interest rates somewhat higher than US rates at the
short end, as reflected in three-month Treasury
bills, in order to provide a more persuasive story to
savers and investors.5This reaction mitigated the
impact on the currency, though it did not eliminate
it completely. Canada was by no means targeting
the exchange rate, either bilaterally or in terms of its
effective (G-10) exchange rate. However, it might
be fairly said to have had (for want of something
better, i.e., a clear domestic anchor) a de facto
“crawling peg” for the Canada-US exchange rate,
and thereby a dragging monetary anchor on
inflation. 
As interest rates escalated, there were many calls
for a “made in Canada” monetary policy. This was
accompanied by strong questioning from the
Minister of Finance, Allan MacEachen, as to what
the Bank thought it was up to through the regular
consultations “on monetary policy and on its
relation to general economic policy” that the
Governor is required to undertake with the
Minister of Finance under the Bank of Canada Act.
It was in this tense domestic context that the Bank
of Canada made its concerns, indeed fears, known
forcefully at one of the regular G-10 Governors
4 The author was seconded from the Bank to the body administering the controls for a few months, beginning in late 1975.
5 To assist the process, the Bank moved from a fixed to a floating Bank rate.Commentary 299 | 5
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Figure 3: Three-Month Treasury Bill Rates, 1960-2009
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meetings held at the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. According to
Governor Bouey’s informal oral account of the
meeting to the author and other Bank officials, he
had stated that without an easing in the US policy
stance on monetary expansion, “we will all be
shovelling out money soon by the bucketful to save
failed businesses,” or words close to that. In any
event, US policy backed off somewhat beginning in
1982, to significant relief at the Bank of Canada.
A Temporary Peace
In the mid-1980s and up to 1987, Canadian
monetary policy was essentially running in neutral –
paying some attention still to the exchange rate but
not being particularly preoccupied by much else.
This was in part perhaps because the Bank was
coping with the fallout from the twin failures in
1985 of two small Western banks, an event that had
the shock value of being the first such occurrences in
Canada since 1923. In any case, as monetary
conditions eased in the United States, so did they in
Canada. And inflation eased off as well. By early
1987, inflation in Canada was down to about 4
percent – and indeed somewhat less than it had
been when Mr. Bouey entered office 14 years earlier.
By way of a conclusion for this part of the
account and as a lead-in to the next, I want to note
Gerald Bouey’s key remarks in his 1982 Per
Jacobssen Lecture, “Finding a Place to Stand.”
There, he made a point of observing that
“monetary policy must therefore give high priority
to the preservation of the value of money,” and
concluded by saying that “economic performance
over time will be better if monetary policy never
loses sight of the goal of maintaining the value of
money.”  My own thinking was that since this was
true, the important question still to be faced was
how the Bank of Canada should go about having
these sensible observations be not only true but also
more real. This meant that we needed to test
further the meaning of the phrase “high priority.”
Section Two: From 1987 On – Taking
the Initiative 
Monetary policy for several years after 1987
afforded some contrast with the earlier period. The
Bank set out its stall early, and pursued the
objective of inflation reduction with consistent
focus – a single-mindedness that at the time seemed
praiseworthy to some and noxious to many.
Inflation did come down significantly (though not
easily), and from about 1992 inflation in Canada,
as measured by the CPI, has stayed, at least on a
core basis, at around 2 percent. That is to say, there
have been no further sustained reductions in
inflation, and therefore, the years following lie
outside the inflation-reduction focus of this study.
The Bank of Canada’s Authority to Act
This is territory that is both tricky and sensitive.
Judging by its statutory mandate as set out in the
preamble to the Bank of Canada Act, the Bank has
considerable scope to set the course of monetary
policy. This scope is, as already mentioned, subject
to “regular consultation” with the Minister of
Finance and, ultimately, a possible ministerial
directive. However, it should be emphasized that
regular consultation is not the same as taking
instructions, although it surely does mean listening
very carefully. And if it did mean taking
instructions, there would be no need for the explicit
provisions in the Bank of Canada Act under which
the Minister may issue a directive to the Bank on
the specific policy to be followed, provided the
directive is published forthwith. No directive has
ever been issued.6
6 For specifics regarding the Bank’s mandate as set out in the preamble to the Bank of Canada Act, and also the consultation/directive provisions in
the Act, see Appendix A. It is worth noting that these provisions, which later became known as the ‘dual responsibility’ doctrine, were introduced
at the initiative of the third governor, Louis Rasminsky, as a condition for his taking office upon the forced resignation of his predecessor, James
Coyne (for a recent account of this episode, see Powell 2009). It is also important to note that he, and his successors, have made clear that if the
government were to give such a directive to the Bank, the likely result would be that the Governor would resign. This is because if the Governor
could agree in good conscience with a course of policy that the Minister of Finance had proposed, there would in fact be no need for a directive.
At the same time, the Minister of Finance has an undeniably clear power and specific instrument through which to command a change in
monetary policy if he chooses.7 As is well illustrated in the recently published memoirs of Prime Ministers Chrétien, Martin and Mulroney. 
8 It is also worth noting, and somewhat contrary to tendencies often prevailing elsewhere, that the Bank did not cast aspersions on fiscal policy.
One important consideration here, besides the fact that the Minister of Finance knew very well that he had issues, was that it would not be useful
to leave any impression that monetary policy might be pushed off its anti-inflationary path by problems with other policies.
9 When the “Edmonton Manifesto” was being drafted, a point of considerable discussion between myself and Charles Freedman, a deputy
governor, was whether the goal should be termed “price stability” or rather, “very low inflation.”  My preference on terminology prevailed. I leave
it to others to decide whether what exists now in Canada as an inflation target – namely, two percent – is “low” or “very low” inflation.
This being said, it can be taken for granted that,
however these provisions are read, the Governor
will always wish to get along with the Minister of
Finance and his officials, and in particular to find
common ground regarding the monetary policy to
be pursued. In my time, Michael Wilson (the
Minister of Finance for most of the period) was
fundamentally supportive of the clear anti-
inflationary stance taken, because he thought that
this was the way the world was going, and also the
way it needed to go. However, some of his senior
officials clearly were not so supportive, government
in general was manifestly ambivalent, and the
Opposition openly hostile.7 However, and contrary
to the earlier years, it is worth noting that in this
period the federal government said relatively little
about inflation. Thereby, it endorsed at least
implicitly the Bank’s responsibility for both
monetary policy goals and instrumentation. At the
same time, the Bank itself said a great deal, in
governor’s speech after speech.8
For my part, since I was concerned not to leave a
policy vacuum that others might seek to fill in an
unhelpful way, I was quick to set forth publicly my
view that the central contribution of Canadian
monetary policy to the nation’s economic well-
being was to promote confidence in the future
value of Canadian money by establishing and
maintaining domestic price stability. Salient
features of that publicity program were a lecture in
early 1988 at the University of Alberta that
monetary-policy followers afterwards termed the
“Edmonton  Manifesto,” and a follow-up speech in
the spring at the annual meetings of the Canadian
Economics Association. There, my remarks were
met with particular interest – though with more
attentive curiosity than general enthusiasm. The
thoughts being expressed were not, it seemed to
me, very different in substance from those
enunciated by my predecessor in his 1982 Per
Jacobssen lecture, but there seemed to be a sense
around that there would be more monetary policy
action to implement them.
So What Is “Price Stability”?
Economists generally know, and central bankers
certainly do, that it is much easier to talk about
price stability than to define it. And at no point did
the Bank volunteer a numerical price-stability
target – although early on I did, in response to a
media question, indicate that as regards a desirable
rate of inflation, “three is better than four, two
better than three, one better than two, and zero
better than any of them.”  In any case, for the
earlier part of my term, inflation was,
notwithstanding anything the Bank said or did,
moving up not down. This was a result of general
demand pressures in the Canadian economy – not
a single inflationary supply shock in sight. So the
Bank could hardly be faulted that severely for
raising interest rates, and then keeping them up.
However, what was made clear even then was that
as far as the Bank was concerned, “price stability”
would be distinctly less than 4 percent inflation
(where we had started) and that zero inflation was
not being ruled out.9 It also became increasingly
clear that the Bank insisted on being judged on
how it did regarding inflation and regarding
progress toward price stability. 
While no timetable for progress was set, it soon
was evident that the Bank was setting about
fighting inflation in a more vigorous way than
before. In regard to its monetary operations, one
difference that showed up prominently for several
years from 1987 was a wider spread of Canadian
short-term interest rates over US ones.
Traditionally, Canadian short rates had stayed close
to US equivalents  – almost always above, but not
by a great deal, around a percentage point or two.
But in my time, they moved up progressively to
some 5 percentage points above US rates by the end
Commentary 299 | 7
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of 1990 – and without any apology from the
central bank as it tried to turn the tide in inflation
to a better direction. This was done basically by
having Canadian rates go up, but more, as US ones
rose during 1987 and1988, and, by keeping a tight
rein on central bank liquidity, not letting ours go
down nearly as much when US rates declined. This
change in the “rules of the game” – this “made-in-
Canada” policy, or decoupling – got widespread
attention, especially because the Canadian dollar
was moving up also. More on the exchange rate a
little later.
Overlap with Other Policies
Fiscal policy
The relationship between fiscal policy (both federal
and provincial) and a focussed anti-inflationary
monetary policy was a contentious issue through-
out the period. Governments had not taken
advantage of earlier, stronger, economic conditions
to improve their fiscal situations. So difficult fiscal
debts and deficits only worsened as monetary
policy fought inflation with interest rates that went
higher than anyone was counting on, and which
shifted down only in a cautious manner as
economic activity weakened beginning in 1990.
The fact that inflation initially was tending to
move up strengthened the Bank of Canada’s
arguments for its policy position in one sense but
made it awkward in another. Finance Minister
Wilson, in pressing for action to deal with the
federal debt and deficit (this had been publicized as
a source of serious concern by the government as
early as 1985), apparently would point out that
fiscal tightening would lead to an easing in interest
rates. This was correct as far as it went. The
difficulty was that it meant only that interest rates
would be lower than otherwise, and not necessarily
lower than they were at that time – because Canada
was in a situation where, despite monetary policy’s
initial efforts, inflation pressures were persisting. In
short, for this reason there could be no compelling
grand bargain between monetary and fiscal policy
in regard to interest rate relief – at least not one that


















Canada United States Differential
Figure 5: 10-Year Government Bond Rates, 1960-2009
Note: Prior to 1982:Q2, Government of Canada marketable bonds over 10 years, average yield.
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 176-0043 and U.S. Federal Reserve.10 On a mildly technical plane, it can be noted that for a number of years the Bank attempted to “measure” monetary policy through the use of a
monetary conditions index – a weighted average of interest-rate and exchange-rate changes. However, this approach was finally discarded,
essentially because exchange-rate changes were not provoked solely by financial market considerations, thus making the index a challenge to
interpret from a monetary point of view.
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In point of fact, strong action on the fiscal front
was some time coming. Federal fiscal policy did not
make a sharp turn in that direction, with major
expenditure cuts, until early 1995, and then very
much as a direct consequence of the “Hudson Bay
peso” confidence crisis. The crisis was provoked by
the Mexican financial collapse that started in late
1994, and  led to a heightened awareness in
markets that Canada had a serious fiscal problem.
This occurred after my watch (which ended in early
1994) but it is worth noting that the fiscal turn did
occur in an environment where inflation was
already greatly reduced and interest rates (apart
from the immediate crisis-induced effects on
Canadian money-market rates) were much lower.
Finally, it can be noted here that a change in tax
policy did come to play a triggering role in the
birth of the inflation-targeting regime in early
1991. That development will be addressed below.
Trade policy and the exchange rate
As already noted, the widened short-term interest
rate differentials sponsored by the Bank exerted
upward pressure on the Canada-US dollar exchange
rate – the bilateral rate that matters far above all
others for Canada. This appreciation was bound to
be unpopular among exporters. But it also came
under more widespread criticism, including in
government circles, because at that time Canada
was heavily engaged in promoting and negotiating
its bilateral Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, and
subsequently working to conclude the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) upon
the inclusion of Mexico in the negotiations.
However, there was one sense in which the
Bank’s stance eased the negotiation of the free trade
agreements – something that Canada sorely
wanted. It was evident that one of the sticking
points on the US side was concern among its
domestic constituencies (particularly, it seems, US
labour) that Canada, with its floating currency,
would engage in competitive depreciation, thereby
undermining the short-term US economics behind
the deal. But while Canada’s currency had in fact
depreciated significantly after the earlier burst of
appreciation upon its 1970 float, the Bank was able
to demonstrate that because of Canada’s greater
inflation from 1973 on, this potential trade
advantage was not reflected particularly in the real
bilateral rate, which takes price-level differentials
into account. Furthermore, the US Treasury could
hardly hold that Canada’s monetary policy stance 
in the late 1980s was contrary to  the immediate
trade  interests of the US.
More broadly, the Bank took an attitude of what
might be termed “benign neglect” toward the
currency. For one thing, this meant that we stayed
out of currency entanglements such as the short-
lived and unlamented Louvre exchange-rate accord
of February 1987, notwithstanding Canada’s
burning desire to be seen as a full-fledged
participating member of G-7. My express concern
at the time was that this would stop Canada doing
the right thing with its monetary policy, for fear of
upsetting a pre-packaged US-Canada dollar
exchange rate – that is, going back into a problem
that Canada faced in the late 1960s. For another
thing, in terms of ongoing policy, we did not adjust
interest rates either to try to bring the currency
down or to hold it up (except at times of
confidence crisis). And in fact the currency did
behave in a broadly appropriate way from the
viewpoint of desired monetary policy results. It
moved up during the time that inflation was being
battled, and subsequently (the latter part of my
term) moved down as inflation came under better
control, but without provoking renewed inflation.
Canadian short-term interest rates of course also
adjusted upwards and then in a downward
direction over the period in question.1011 The term ‘VAT’ was unpopular in Canada and shunned by government.
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Getting on Top of Inflation
In terms of drama, political economy implications
and interest among other policymakers and
monetary economists generally, the big event in the
period 1987-94 was the introduction of inflation-
reduction targets (yes, inflation reduction) in early
1991. This is not the occasion to examine the pros
and cons of such targets. In any event, when Canada
adopted them there was no literature available,
although policymakers could look to the example of
New Zealand, which had adopted targets about a
year earlier. Rather, in the section below I identify
some features in the early Canadian experience that
may be of broader interest.
￿ First, the adoption of targets was the result of an
approach by the Minister of Finance to the
Governor, in the fall of 1990. While I can only
speculate on the reasons for this approach, I am
inclined to believe that it was the product of two
things. On the one hand, the government’s
decision to introduce a value-added tax as of
early 1991 would by itself push prices up by
about 1 ½ percent. On the other, the Bank had
already made clear that, while conceding this
first-round effect, it would move determinedly
against any knock-on effects, i.e., through wages.
This latter likelihood seemed real enough,
inasmuch as the tax was not at all popular and
powerful union leaders were claiming 7 percent
wage increases to offset, as they chose to see it,
the 7 percent Good and Services Tax or GST.11
(Coincidentally with the introduction of the
targets and the tax, the government also froze the
salaries of all federal public servants. This would
increase their interest in a good inflation
outcome, although it is unlikely that the
government did it for this particular reason.)
￿ Second, the fact that the federal government
took the initiative because of its pressing GST
problem put the Bank in a good position to
bargain for more ambitious targets for inflation
reduction than the Department of Finance
originally envisaged. These included getting
specific targets for inflation lower than 3
percent and commitments to inflation
reduction for a longer rather than shorter span
of years. The Bank did this in recognition of
the very fact that in signing on to such an
agreement, it would itself be committed with
government to a course for  monetary policy in
a way that it had not been before. Such
commitment was probably fine, as long as it
was on the basis of strong anti-inflationary
numbers that government was also committed
to, and which had a decently lengthy policy
horizon. The result of some strenuous
negotiations was a series of announced targets
that foresaw a reduction in inflation over four
years from the early 1991 year-to-year peak
(with the GST effect) of close to 7 percent, to 2
percent by 1995.
￿ Third, while this was as far as matters could be
pressed at that time in terms of specific targets,
the Bank also obtained agreement that 2
percent was not necessarily the end point,
though admittedly further work needed to be
done to establish what would constitute price
stability. Also, it was declared, the experience
gained over the time it would take to get to 2
percent, should itself be expected to produce
evidence on what more might, or might not, be
done. In other words, the Bank was trying very
hard to embed a long-term and progressive
commitment from both parties.
￿ Fourth, while inflation targets these days are
principally seen around the world as a means of
anchoring inflation expectations, as initially
employed in Canada they were supposed to
steer expectations, along with inflation itself, in
a downward direction.
￿ Fifth, while refinements such as the concept of
flexible inflation targeting came much later, it is
worth noting that the Canadian set-up made
explicit provision for coping with adverse
inflation shocks (such as another hike in the
GST, for example). Specifically, explicit
provision was made for an agreement between
the Bank and the Department of Finance as to
what would be an appropriate path back to the
inflation target in the event of a shock of
sufficient magnitude. What would be “suffi-
cient magnitude”?  At my news conference12 Canadian monetary policy had become a political issue, at least for the Opposition. What then was the alternative?  The new government, when
in opposition, had announced in the fall 1993 election campaign that its “two-track policy of economic growth and fiscal responsibility will make
possible a monetary policy that produces lower real interest rates and keeps inflation low, so that we can be competitive with our partners.”
However, no one explained what that meant in terms of monetary policy actions, and I have been unable to as well.
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upon the announcement of the targets, when
questioned as to what size shock would qualify
for special treatment, I told the media (to their
evident disappointment) that we would know a
shock of sufficient magnitude when we saw
one. None has to date been identified as large
enough to merit such treatment.
￿ Sixth, is the fact that inflation dropped rapidly,
and more rapidly than provided for. 
￿ Seventh, there was already a store of
disinflationary pressure from monetary policy
at the time that the targets went into effect 
in early 1991. 
￿ Eighth, and not least important for the longer
run, it was recognized by the federal government
that not only was the Bank of Canada the agent
responsible for inflation performance, but it was
also to play a central role in the design and
further development of the targets. 
This final point has had lasting implications, albeit
after an early and very significant deviation from
the principle on the part of government. The one
occasion when government’s role became active in
the intervening years was in late 1993 when,
coincident with the appointment of a new Bank of
Canada governor, the government in a joint
communiqué with the Bank of Canada announced
that the target would be 2 per cent (mid-point of a
1 to 3 per cent range) at least until 1998. Also, the
earlier, 1991, agreed commitment to “price
stability” being a rate of inflation “clearly below 2
per cent” as the probable eventual goal was
expunged. While the incoming Minister of
Finance, Paul Martin, was apparently not, at least
initially, a fan of inflation targeting, he may have
considered the arrangement too risky to drop
wholesale. The obvious question he and his
colleagues faced, especially for an economy such as
Canada’s, was what policy to put in place of
inflation targeting that would pass muster with
holders of claims on Canada, whether domestic or
foreign.12 Since that time, inflation has stayed
broadly consistent with the official Bank of Canada
goal, now, of “low and stable inflation.” The term
“price stability” almost disappeared from the Bank’s
lexicon in later years.
With that notable exception to the record, the
Department of Finance has limited itself to
approval or otherwise of Bank of Canada initiatives
in regard to targets. However, this has also included
approval as to the extent to which there should be
any officially sponsored, publicly disseminated,
review of those targets – such as the one that the
Bank of Canada is leading at the present time. The
Bank (with a sign-off from the current Minister of
Finance) announced in November 2006, after
many years of promising to undertake a review of
the inflation-targeting framework, a wide-ranging
program of research designed to re-examine many
aspects of it. This re-examination is going to go so
far as looking at the value of lowering the current  2
percent inflation target, as well as at price-level
targeting – something that was quite recently
advocated, but not actually tried, for Japan.
Such a comprehensive review of the basics is the
only one that has been undertaken since targeting
was instituted in 1991. And the lack of such an
examination until now might well be seen as a
monetary policy transparency issue, and one that is
deeper than the kinds that central banks, monetary
economists and the financial markets customarily
focus on.
Furthermore, when the Bank comes to its
conclusions, the capacity of the Department of
Finance to engage in serious debate and policy
formation on inflation-targeting issues will be
seriously put to the test. 
The Lessons                                 
This paper has contrasted two experiences with
inflation reduction – the drawn out Canadian battle
over the period from the early 1970s to 1987, and
the shorter one from 1987 to 1992. Shorter is clearly
better. But was that shorter, sharper, campaign even
necessary, when the end result was a mere two
percentage points off inflation?  That is to say, critics
of the second campaign might argue that it was not13 It would be fascinating of course to stress test this proposition further by repeating the experience of the 1970s and early 1980s, with the same
US conditions and monetary policy as in that period, but with the more robust Canadian domestic monetary policy stance that has developed
since then. However, it is also to be hoped that nothing like this needs to be in the works.
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needed – that the “great inflation” was over by 1987
and that 4 percent inflation was good enough. 
However, under that scenario there would surely
remain a very open and unavoidable question
concerning what monetary policy was going to do
in regard to inflation and what should Canadians
expect. I did not think that 4 percent was a credible
goal because I did not think that economic agents
would believe that the authorities would stick to a
number that promised, essentially, “inflation.”
That is to say, if 4 was okay, why not 5, why not 6,
and so on?  And why would policy then fight to
bring it down when it moved up?  The test here
may be whether it can be demonstrated that strong
expectations regarding an unchanged future course
of inflation are likely to form at a rate as “high” as 4
percent. My own view is that we would discover
that there is no such demonstration, and that only
generating a number appreciably closer to “price
stability” would provide an adequate basis for
expectations that buttress the objective. The
Canadian experience, while not as ambitious as it
might well have been from 1994 on, does not, at
least, disprove that view.
Another feature of our monetary experience
worth emphasizing is that while Canada is now a
relatively small and very open economy it has, in
the end, been able to turn in a very decent domestic
inflation performance on the basis of its home-
grown monetary efforts. This is not to say that
external conditions do not matter, but on the
Canadian evidence to date, they cannot be taken to
be decisive.13 In other words, the Canadian dollar
exchange rate has behaved in a broadly appropriate
way as an adjustment mechanism. This allows,
among other things, Canadian monetary policy to
focus properly on the value of the Canadian dollar
within Canada. Whether a floating rate regime is
truly the best system for Canada is a topic that
surfaces periodically, but one that is outside the
scope of this paper. However, what can be said here
with assurance is that Canadian monetary policy
can work appropriately under such a regime,
inasmuch as it can in the end deliver a decent
domestic inflation outcome as a sustained
contribution to national economic well-being. Put
another way, if Canada were to move to some other
exchange-rate regime, it would not be because its
monetary policy cannot, in practice as well as in
theory, deliver the goods on inflation.
My final observation is that the Canadian
experience supports the maxim that “inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” –
in the following particular sense. What that
experience suggests is that there will not be a fully
convincing stance against inflation, whether
reduction or prevention, unless the central bank
takes a prominent role, or better still the lead,
through its monetary policy actions and through a
clear articulation of its monetary policy priorities.
Relying on general government to give sufficient
focus to inflation control, whether through income
controls or fiscal policy, or through executive
direction to monetary policy, is inherently and
demonstrably implausible. This is because of both
the multiplicity of governmental objectives and the
speed with which governmental objectives and
priorities are inevitably shuffled. It is of course
helpful if government recognizes this, and thereby
recognizes that the central bank has to take the lead
as regards what is done and also, quite likely, what
has to be done. That is an essential difference
between the second period and the first. Those
who, as is commonplace in Canada, place the big
change in inflation performance in Canada on the
introduction of inflation targeting in 1991,
overlook the way monetary policy laid the
groundwork in the years before. That is to say,
without downplaying the particular contribution of
government, monetary policy was decisive for a
remarkably successful entry into those targets. A
strong monetary policy will also, as one looks
ahead, be decisive in preserving and enhancing
monetary confidence for Canadians – which is why
the current review as to what can be done better
through inflation-control (dare one say “price
stability”?) targets is so important.Commentary 299 | 13
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1. Preamble
WHEREAS it is desirable to establish a central
bank in Canada to regulate credit and currency in
the best interests of the economic life of the
nation, to control and protect the external value of
the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its
influence fluctuations in the general level of
production, trade, prices and employment, so far
as may be possible within the scope of monetary
action, and generally to promote the economic
and financial welfare of Canada.
2. Government direction
Consultations
(1)The Minister and the Governor shall consult
regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to
general economic policy.
Minister’s directive
(2) If, notwithstanding the consultations provided
for in subsection (1), there should emerge a
difference of opinion between the Minister and the
Bank concerning the monetary policy to be
followed, the Minister may, after consultation with
the Governor and with the approval of the
Governor in Council, give to the Governor a
written directive concerning monetary policy, in
specific terms and applicable for a specified period,
and the Bank shall comply with that directive.
Publication and report
(3) A directive given under this section shall be
published forthwith in the Canada Gazette and
shall be laid before Parliament within fifteen days
after the giving thereof, or, if Parliament is not then
sitting, on any of the first fifteen days next
thereafter that either House of Parliament is sitting.
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